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Fiscal Policy, Consumption Risk, and Stock
Returns: Evidence from U.S. States
Zhi Da, Mitch Warachka, and Hayong Yun*
Abstract
We find that consumption risk is lower in states that implement countercyclical fiscal poli-
cies. Moreover, firms with an investor base that is concentrated in countercyclical states
have lower stock returns, along with firms that relocate their headquarters to a countercycli-
cal state. Therefore, countercyclical fiscal policies lower the consumption risk of investors
and, consequently, their required equity return premium. This conclusion is confirmed by
smaller declines in market participation during recessions in countercyclical states. Over-
all, the location of a firm’s investor base enables state-level fiscal policy to influence stock
returns.
I. Introduction
The controversies surrounding fiscal policy usually involve its macroeco-
nomic implications for unemployment or investment. In contrast, we investigate
the impact of fiscal policy at the state level on stock returns. Our study pro-
vides two novel empirical findings regarding consumption-based asset pricing in
a market with imperfect risk sharing among investors. First, countercyclical fiscal
policies lower consumption risk. Second, firms with an investor base that is
*Da, zda@nd.edu, University of Notre Dame Mendoza College of Business; Warachka (corre-
sponding author), mwarachka@sandiego.edu, University of San Diego School of Business; and Yun,
yunha@broad.msu.edu, Michigan State University Broad College of Business. We thank Jennifer Con-
rad (the editor) and Mariano Croce (the referee) for helpful comments. We also thank Bo Becker,
Frederico Belo, Effi Benmelech, Michael Brennan, Cristina Cella, Henrik Cronqvist, Phillip Dybvig,
Antonio Fatas, Wayne Ferson, Francisco Gomes, Klaus Grobys, Harrison Hong, Eric Hughson, Chris-
tian Julliard, Andrew Karolyi, Roger Loh, Dong Lou, Joel Peress, Jeff Pontiff, Lucio Sarno, Ivan
Shaliastovich, Richard Smith, Jiang Wang, Tracy Wang, Scott Weisbenner, Shu Yan, and Fan Yu for
their comments as well as participants at the 2013 Sun Trust Beach Conference, the 2013 Financial
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concentrated in countercyclical states have lower stock returns. Intuitively, state-
level fiscal policy impacts the consumption risk of investors and, consequently,
their required equity return premium.
Our results are consistent with state governments financing consumption
during recessions through their budget deficits. For example, tax reductions dur-
ing a recession can finance consumption that otherwise would have required in-
vestors to sell a larger portion of their equity portfolio or invest less in the equity
market. Without this countercyclical fiscal policy, investors may require a higher
equity return premium as compensation for their higher consumption risk.
Ricardian equivalence (Barro–Ricardo equivalence theorem) disputes the ability
of government budget deficits to stabilize consumption because government debt
issuance increases expected taxes. However, household borrowing constraints and
difficulties hedging income shocks allow fiscal policy to influence consumption.1
The ability of state governments to issue debt also differs from that of the fed-
eral government. Because state governments are constrained by their respec-
tive balanced-budget amendments, many states have adopted budget stabilization
funds that accumulate precautionary savings to facilitate countercyclical fiscal
policies.
A state’s fiscal policy is identified by the sensitivity of its budget deficit (sur-
plus) to state-level economic growth. Specifically, we estimate state-level fiscal
policy betas to identify variation in fiscal policy across states. We also estimate a
predicted fiscal policy beta for each state based on the deposit rules of its budget
stabilization fund and its frequency of having a Democratic governor. Counter-
cyclical states are more likely to accumulate precautionary savings through strin-
gent deposit rules and are more likely to elect a Democratic governor.2
We find that consumption declines less during bust periods in countercyclical
states. A bust period for a state is defined as negative economic growth relative to
the prior year. A 1-standard-deviation fluctuation in the fiscal policy beta results in
consumption declining 1.47% less during bust periods in the countercyclical state.
Thus, consumption risk is lower in countercyclical states. Moreover, consumption
in the 5 most procyclical states is 34% more volatile than consumption in the
5 most countercyclical states. This cross-sectional variation in consumption is
consistent with imperfect risk sharing within the United States.
The local-investment-bias literature (Coval and Moskowitz (1999)) doc-
uments the tendency of investors to overweight nearby firms. Pirinsky and
Wang (2006) find evidence of return comovement attributable to correlated trad-
ing among investors in the same location. Korniotis and Kumar (2013) and
Kumar, Page, and Spalt (2012) confirm that the trades of local investors are
1Heaton and Lucas (1992), (1996) demonstrate the importance of borrowing constraints and in-
complete insurance. Lucas (1994) notes that investors self-insure against transitory shocks to labor
income through precautionary savings. However, Brav, Constantinides, and Geczy (2002) find evi-
dence that consumption is not completely insured, whereas Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004)
find that precautionary savings provide inadequate insurance against a prolonged negative income
shock (unemployment).
2Tuzel and Zhang (2017) estimate local betas for metropolitan areas based on their industrial com-
position. However, these local risk factors are motivated by immobile assets such as real estate whose
markets clear at the metropolitan level, not differences in the fiscal policy of metropolitan areas.
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correlated and, consequently, that a firm’s cost of equity depends on its head-
quarters location.3
We initially compute a firm-level local-investment-bias measure that cap-
tures the sensitivity of a firm’s investor base to the fiscal policy of the state in
which its headquartered. We find that the combination of local investor bias and
a countercyclical fiscal policy lowers equity returns. State-level political uncer-
tainty cannot explain this finding. In terms of economic significance, a 0.70%
annual difference in their cost of equity is attributable to a fluctuation in the fiscal
policy beta of 1 standard deviation. The difference in the average fiscal policy beta
of the 5 most countercyclical states versus the 5 most procyclical states produces
a return difference of 2.59% per year. Headquarters relocations confirm the im-
portance of state-level fiscal policy to returns because firms relocating to a more
countercyclical state subsequently have lower stock returns.
We then aggregate the state-level fiscal policy betas across investors to esti-
mate the fiscal policy of each firm’s investor base. This aggregate fiscal policy beta
is computed using the dollar-denominated holdings of all institutional investors
in a firm and the fiscal policy beta associated with their respective state locations.
Using the aggregate fiscal policy betas, we find that firms have lower stock returns
if their investor base is concentrated in countercyclical states. Predicted fiscal pol-
icy betas, which condition on state-level budget-stabilization fund-deposit rules
and the political affiliation of state governors, confirm that countercyclical fiscal
policies lower stock returns.
Two channels enable countercyclical fiscal policies to influence stock re-
turns: a discount-rate channel and a cash-flow channel. Both of these channels
originate from geographic segmentation. The discount-rate channel arises from
the location of investors, whereas the cash-flow channel arises from the location
of customers. The importance of investor location to the relation between fiscal
policy and stock returns supports the discount-rate channel. State-level market
participation lends further support to the discount-rate channel. Specifically, par-
ticipation in the equity market declines less during recessions in countercyclical
states and exhibits less variation over time.
Nonetheless, by smoothing the consumption of households (including non-
investors), countercyclical fiscal policies can stabilize firm-level cash flow.
However, unlike consumption, cash flow does not decline less during bust periods
for firms headquartered in more countercyclical states. Using the data of Garcia
and Norli (2012), we construct firm-level cash-flow betas by weighting the state-
level fiscal policy betas by the fraction of a firm’s operations in each state. We find
that the ability of these cash-flow betas to explain returns is limited to firms that
operate in a single state. Intuitively, the influence of state-level fiscal policy on
cash flow is mitigated by firms having diversified operations across several states.
Korniotis and Kumar (2013) also conclude that a firm’s cost of capital depends on
the discount-rate channel instead of the cash-flow channel.4
3The economic justification for the local investment bias has been attributed to informational ad-
vantages (Ivković and Weisbenner (2005)), familiarity (Huberman (2001)), and social interactions
(Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), Ivković and Weisbenner (2007)).
4Weak empirical support for the cash flow channel in our sample of public firms does not nec-
essarily imply its irrelevance. With access to the public equity market, firms can expand and lower
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Although Korniotis and Kumar (2013) do not examine the role of fiscal pol-
icy, an extensive literature on fiscal policy precedes our empirical study. Poterba
(1994) examines cross-sectional variation in fiscal policy across states. However,
this study does not examine its implications for consumption risk or stock returns.
Moreover, the existing literature that studies the consumption implications of fis-
cal policy typically focuses on specific stimulus programs initiated by the federal
government during recessions. Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2013)
report that stimulus payments during the 2008 financial crisis increased house-
hold consumption, and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) document increased
consumption following the 2001 tax rebates. In contrast, we focus on the cross-
sectional relation between state-level fiscal policy and consumption risk, along
with its implications for stock returns.
Our study of state-level fiscal policy mitigates the policy and tax uncertainty
induced by intervention in the economy by the federal government. Pastor and
Veronesi (2012) examine the impact of government policy uncertainty on asset
prices. Pastor and Veronesi (2013) estimate a risk premium for government pol-
icy uncertainty, and Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi (2016) find empirical evidence
that political uncertainty increases the implied volatility of options. However,
instead of uncertainty arising from regulatory and trade policies, the impact of
countercyclical fiscal policies on tax uncertainty is more relevant to our study.
Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012) and Gordon and Leeper (2005) highlight the
long-term cost of countercyclical fiscal policies, with Croce, Kung, Nguyen, and
Schmid (2012) concluding that tax uncertainty is as important to the cost of equity
as the level of taxation.
However, state-level budget stabilization funds accumulate savings before
the occurrence of poor economic conditions to offset debt issuance that is con-
strained by balanced-budget amendments. Therefore, the countercyclical fiscal
policies of state governments induce less uncertainty regarding future taxation. On
average, countercyclical states have nearly identical levels of outstanding debt as
procyclical states (normalized by economic output). Moreover, outstanding debt
at the state level is typically below 10% of annual economic output, which is far
below the federal government’s ratio of debt to gross domestic product (debt–GDP
ratio).
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section II details the
estimation of fiscal policy at the state level. Section III provides our results re-
garding the relation between fiscal policy and consumption risk, and Section IV
provides our results regarding the relation between fiscal policy and stock returns.
Section V then offers our conclusions.
II. State-Level Fiscal Policy
Korniotis (2008) highlights three advantages of using state-level data to ex-
amine consumption-based asset pricing models. First, state-level data have less
measurement error than individual data. Second, income shocks are not fully
their exposure to the fiscal policy of any individual state. In contrast, the sensitivity of consumption to
state-level fiscal policy may reflect purchases from smaller firms whose operations are concentrated in
a few states.
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diversified across states. Third, there is considerable cross-sectional variation in
consumption across states. Our analysis identifies another important property of
using state-level data: variation in fiscal policy.
Although our cross-sectional tests are limited to 50 states, international stud-
ies often involve fewer countries, and their conclusions are complicated by dif-
ferences in labor markets as well as legal, political, and monetary institutions
(Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003)). In contrast, state-level
data enable us to condition on deposit rules and political affiliations, whose defi-
nitions are comparable across states.
Nonetheless, in an international setting, Julio and Yook (2012) conclude
that investment declines around national elections, and Durnev (2010) reports
that investment is less sensitive to stock prices during election periods. In ad-
dition, Brogaard and Detzel (2015) construct a country-specific proxy for eco-
nomic policy uncertainty and report that greater uncertainty reduces investment.
Within the United States, Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) find that stock returns
are higher during Democratic presidencies, and Belo, Gala, and Li (2013) report
that the market is positively surprised by the spending policies of Democratic
presidents. In contrast to their time-series methodologies, we examine the con-
sumption and long-term return implications of government fiscal policy from a
cross-sectional perspective. Thus, the motivation for our study is return variation
attributable to differences in fiscal policy at the state level rather than errors in
investor expectations.
To identify a state’s fiscal policy, we examine the response of its budget
deficit (surplus) to different economic conditions. Annual data on state govern-
ment revenue and expenditures as well as the gross state product (GSP) of each
state from 1965 to 2008 are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the United
States maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. Our sample ends in 2008 due to the
availability of state-level data.
Annual budget deficits, and consequently surpluses, are defined as follows:
(1) DEFICITi ,t =
EXPENDITUREi ,t −REVENUEi ,t
GSPi ,t
.
When positive, this state-year observation represents a budget deficit for state
i in year t . Conversely, when negative, this state-year observation represents a
budget surplus. To clarify, withdrawals from a budget stabilization fund facilitate
expenditures in excess of revenue that correspond to a budget deficit. For example,
during the financial crisis, budget stabilization funds provided an average of 5.1%
of state government expenditures. Deposits into a budget stabilization fund are
included in expenditures and correspond to a smaller budget surplus in normal
economic conditions.
The nature of each state’s fiscal policy is estimated using the following state-
level time-series regression:
DEFICITi ,t = βi ,1GSP GROWTHi ,t +βi ,2GSP GROWTHi ,t−1(2)
+βi ,3DEFICITi ,t−1+ εi ,t ,
based on GSP growth in state i between year t and t−1. Because economic condi-
tions and budget deficits are autocorrelated, equation (2) includes a state’s lagged
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GSP growth and lagged budget deficit. The inclusion of additional lags does not
change our results. Svec and Kondo (2012) estimate a regression specification that
is similar to equation (2), but their study does not investigate the impact of fiscal
policy on consumption or stock returns.
The βi ,1 coefficient, which measures the sensitivity of a state’s government
budget deficit (surplus) to contemporaneous economic growth, defines state i’s
fiscal policy beta. Hereafter, we abbreviate the fiscal policy beta of state i as
FPBi . Because state governments can implement countercyclical fiscal policies
by lowering taxes or increasing expenditures, the dependent variable DEFICIT
focuses on their difference. Nonetheless, certain government expenditures may
exert a greater impact on stock returns. For example, Belo and Yu (2013) find a
positive relation between government expenditures on public-sector capital and
stock returns.5
We also include the contemporaneous state-level unemployment rate and
personal income growth as additional control variables in equation (2). We then
define the alternative fiscal policy beta as the βi ,1 coefficient in this enhanced
specification. Our later empirical results are consistent using both the original
and alternative fiscal policy betas. The alternative fiscal policy beta denoted
ALTERNATIVE FPB that accounts for a state’s unemployment rate and personal
income has a 0.532 correlation with the original fiscal policy beta from equation
(2). The similarity between these fiscal policy betas and their implications for
consumption risk as well as returns is consistent with GSP growth providing a
sufficient economic signal to guide government policy.
Panel A of Table 1 sorts the state-level FPBs from lowest to highest, with the
average FPB being −0.014. A comparison of the 5 most countercyclical states
and 5 most procyclical states indicates that their average fiscal policy betas equal
−0.239 and 0.206, respectively. This 0.445 difference is highly significant.
For emphasis, only a relative ranking of state-level fiscal policy is required
for our analysis.6 The actual magnitude, and hence significance, of an individ-
ual state’s fiscal policy beta is irrelevant to our later empirical tests. Furthermore,
fiscal policy is evaluated as a time-invariant state characteristic because our objec-
tive is to investigate the cross-sectional relation between fiscal policy and equity
returns over the long term. Nonetheless, we estimate the fiscal policy betas in
2 subperiods: from 1964 to 1985 and from 1986 to 2009. In unreported results
available from the authors, the correlation in the fiscal policy betas across these 2
subperiods equals 0.580. This correlation is higher, 0.746, for the alternative fiscal
policy beta. Therefore, the fiscal policy betas exhibit limited variation over time.
The bottom of Panel A in Table 1 reports on the difference in state character-
istics between the most countercyclical and the most procyclical states as well as
the correlation between these characteristics and the fiscal policy betas. Although
the statistical significance of these differences and correlations is not reported in
Table 1, these characteristics are utilized later in formal empirical specifications.
5In unreported results, removing the government expenditure component from GSP produces
nearly identical fiscal policy betas to those reported in Table 1.
6Therefore, any bias in the state-level fiscal policy betas due to the correlation between GSP growth
and budget deficits (GSP growth and personal income in the alternative fiscal policy betas) is unlikely
to affect our conclusions.
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TABLE 1
State-Level Fiscal Policy
Panel A of Table 1 reports on the state-level fiscal policy betas (FPB) in equation (2) that measure the sensitivity of annual
budget deficits to economic growth (GSP_GROWTH):
DEFICITi ,t = βi ,1GSP_GROWTHi ,t +βi ,2GSP_GROWTHi ,t−1 +βi ,3DEFICITi ,t−1 + εi ,t .
A state’s budget deficit is computed according to equation (1). The fiscal policy beta of state i equals βi ,1. An alternative
fiscal policy beta is estimated by including a state’s unemployment rate and its growth in personal income as independent
variables in equation (2). Panel A also reports the fraction of the sample period that each state’s economic growth is
negative (BUST) and its governor is a Republican. Political uncertainty is measured by the number of transitions in the
political affiliation of a state’s governor. The stringency of the deposit rules governing each state’s budget stabilization
fund on a scale of 1 to 4 is then reported, followed by the volatility of the state’s economic growth. Average state-level
consumption growth is then reported, along with its volatility. Panel B reports summary statistics for the budget deficits of
state governments, along with the correlation between their revenue and expenditures. Average revenue, expenditures,
and outstanding debt normalized by gross state product (GSP) are also reported for each state. Panel C reports predicted
fiscal policy betas that are estimated using equation (3):
FPBi = α0 +α1DRi +α2REP_GOVi + εi .
This regression conditions on the stringency of the deposit rules (DR) for each state’s budget stabilization fund and their
frequency of having a Republican governor (REP_GOV). t -statistics are below each of the estimates in italics. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Fiscal Policy Betas and State Characteristics
Alternative BUST Fraction Political Deposit GSP Consumption Consumption
State FPB FPB Fraction Republican Uncertainty Rules Volatility Growth Volatility
NY −0.347 −0.402 0.022 0.286 3 4 0.030 0.049 0.040
OH −0.312 −0.213 0.022 0.643 5 2 0.035 0.052 0.043
PA −0.261 −0.290 0.022 0.357 5 2 0.026 0.051 0.041
IA −0.149 −0.077 0.043 0.571 3 1 0.044 0.051 0.037
WI −0.126 −0.285 0.022 0.429 6 3 0.031 0.054 0.044
NJ −0.124 −0.172 0.022 0.500 7 2 0.030 0.059 0.044
CT −0.117 −0.174 0.022 0.429 2 2 0.035 0.056 0.049
HI −0.117 −0.138 0.000 0.154 1 1 0.041 0.071 0.071
WV −0.115 −0.010 0.043 0.429 6 2 0.036 0.054 0.046
DE −0.110 −0.056 0.022 0.429 4 2 0.036 0.064 0.050
MI −0.109 −0.056 0.087 0.429 3 4 0.050 0.053 0.048
VA −0.107 −0.161 0.000 0.857 5 4 0.029 0.068 0.050
ME −0.091 −0.176 0.000 0.500 2 2 0.034 0.064 0.050
NV −0.072 −0.108 0.022 0.643 5 4 0.046 0.092 0.059
GA −0.060 −0.090 0.022 0.615 3 2 0.037 0.072 0.055
LA −0.040 −0.062 0.087 0.692 6 2 0.067 0.062 0.055
TN −0.038 −0.084 0.022 0.714 6 3 0.036 0.069 0.053
IL −0.031 −0.128 0.022 0.500 4 2 0.028 0.049 0.046
SC −0.030 −0.119 0.000 0.786 5 3 0.037 0.072 0.050
MN −0.030 −0.145 0.022 0.143 3 1 0.036 0.059 0.046
VT −0.027 −0.108 0.043 0.571 7 2 0.043 0.066 0.047
MA −0.020 −0.187 0.022 0.214 4 2 0.034 0.053 0.057
NM −0.020 −0.109 0.065 0.571 6 2 0.055 0.066 0.051
RI −0.017 −0.097 0.000 0.214 4 1 0.031 0.053 0.055
WA −0.012 −0.144 0.000 0.429 3 2 0.037 0.068 0.049
MT −0.009 −0.056 0.043 0.857 3 1 0.046 0.056 0.049
IN −0.007 −0.037 0.022 0.857 3 4 0.037 0.053 0.046
NE −0.006 0.012 0.000 0.857 7 2 0.039 0.052 0.040
AZ −0.004 −0.069 0.022 0.929 6 4 0.047 0.081 0.061
TX −0.003 −0.067 0.043 0.714 5 2 0.053 0.072 0.052
KY 0.002 −0.039 0.043 0.714 4 2 0.036 0.059 0.047
AR 0.005 −0.093 0.000 0.538 5 1 0.037 0.064 0.059
AK 0.009 0.047 0.152 0.923 6 1 0.137 0.076 0.096
MO 0.011 −0.066 0.022 0.571 6 1 0.031 0.055 0.045
NH 0.014 −0.042 0.043 0.643 6 2 0.044 0.075 0.057
FL 0.031 −0.140 0.022 0.714 5 2 0.042 0.078 0.058
KS 0.050 −0.081 0.022 0.929 7 3 0.035 0.055 0.042
OK 0.055 −0.053 0.087 0.929 5 2 0.056 0.062 0.053
MD 0.055 −0.133 0.000 0.286 3 3 0.028 0.061 0.051
AL 0.066 −0.104 0.022 0.769 4 4 0.036 0.064 0.047
CA 0.068 −0.236 0.022 0.571 5 2 0.036 0.062 0.050
ID 0.076 −0.074 0.000 0.929 2 1 0.044 0.066 0.053
NC 0.099 −0.051 0.000 0.643 4 2 0.031 0.070 0.053
ND 0.101 −0.007 0.109 0.929 2 2 0.087 0.054 0.042
SD 0.121 −0.009 0.022 1.000 2 2 0.053 0.055 0.045
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
State-Level Fiscal Policy
Panel A. Fiscal Policy Betas and State Characteristics (continued)
Alternative BUST Fraction Political Deposit GSP Consumption Consumption
State FPB FPB Fraction Republican Uncertainty Rules Volatility Growth Volatility
OR 0.131 −0.092 0.043 0.500 3 1 0.040 0.058 0.056
WY 0.148 −0.013 0.130 0.929 3 1 0.085 0.065 0.057
UT 0.227 −0.136 0.000 1.000 2 2 0.039 0.074 0.057
CO 0.248 −0.142 0.022 0.786 3 3 0.042 0.070 0.057
MS 0.278 −0.023 0.000 0.833 3 1 0.039 0.062 0.050
Average −0.014 −0.106 0.031 0.629 4.240 2.16 0.043 0.063 0.051
FPB correlation 0.532 0.071 0.517 −0.191 −0.216 0.243 0.295 0.261
Countercyclical −0.239 −0.253 0.026 0.457 4.400 2.400 0.033 0.051 0.041
Procyclical 0.206 −0.081 0.039 0.810 2.800 1.600 0.049 0.066 0.055
Panel B. State Government Deficit Characteristics
Budget Deficit
Correlation
Alternative Std. Revenue/ Average Average
State FPB FPB Mean Dev. Skewness Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Debt
NY −0.347 −0.402 −0.004 0.017 1.610 0.411 0.301 0.289 0.095
OH −0.312 −0.213 −0.012 0.022 3.016 0.483 0.282 0.254 0.041
PA −0.261 −0.290 −0.004 0.016 2.535 0.497 0.259 0.247 0.050
IA −0.149 −0.077 −0.005 0.011 1.418 0.447 0.251 0.239 0.023
WI −0.126 −0.285 −0.011 0.027 2.238 0.228 0.264 0.240 0.054
NJ −0.124 −0.172 −0.006 0.011 1.864 0.598 0.216 0.207 0.078
CT −0.117 −0.174 −0.002 0.011 0.876 0.274 0.190 0.184 0.112
HI −0.117 −0.138 0.000 0.018 1.227 0.540 0.243 0.237 0.128
WV −0.115 −0.010 −0.008 0.011 −1.396 0.641 0.339 0.320 0.085
DE −0.110 −0.056 −0.006 0.014 0.343 0.258 0.149 0.140 0.124
MI −0.109 −0.056 −0.007 0.013 0.895 0.380 0.285 0.271 0.042
VA −0.107 −0.161 −0.006 0.012 1.047 0.331 0.170 0.158 0.035
ME −0.091 −0.176 −0.007 0.016 0.638 0.350 0.274 0.258 0.088
NV −0.072 −0.108 −0.006 0.012 1.061 0.363 0.143 0.136 0.035
GA −0.060 −0.090 −0.004 0.009 1.134 0.542 0.179 0.174 0.030
LA −0.040 −0.062 −0.006 0.012 1.362 0.401 0.249 0.235 0.071
TN −0.038 −0.084 −0.003 0.010 1.489 0.625 0.217 0.211 0.025
IL −0.031 −0.128 −0.005 0.012 2.721 0.417 0.217 0.209 0.051
SC −0.030 −0.119 −0.003 0.014 2.461 0.444 0.239 0.235 0.065
MN −0.030 −0.145 −0.009 0.015 1.642 0.308 0.236 0.222 0.034
VT −0.027 −0.108 −0.007 0.012 1.195 0.474 0.269 0.255 0.118
MA −0.020 −0.187 0.001 0.011 1.241 0.616 0.216 0.214 0.115
NM −0.020 −0.109 −0.017 0.023 3.038 0.465 0.263 0.241 0.053
RI −0.017 −0.097 −0.003 0.016 1.175 0.575 0.262 0.253 0.149
WA −0.012 −0.144 0.001 0.017 0.807 0.287 0.226 0.219 0.048
MT −0.009 −0.056 −0.016 0.014 1.186 0.497 0.311 0.281 0.078
IN −0.007 −0.037 −0.007 0.007 0.677 0.452 0.219 0.208 0.033
NE −0.006 0.012 −0.004 0.012 0.091 0.629 0.262 0.250 0.025
AZ −0.004 −0.069 −0.004 0.010 1.010 0.465 0.182 0.177 0.020
TX −0.003 −0.067 −0.006 0.008 0.462 0.519 0.167 0.157 0.019
KY 0.002 −0.039 −0.005 0.015 1.412 0.390 0.244 0.233 0.078
AR 0.005 −0.093 −0.010 0.013 0.857 0.510 0.231 0.211 0.031
AK 0.009 0.047 −0.040 0.077 −1.561 0.141 0.447 0.360 0.162
MO 0.011 −0.066 −0.009 0.013 1.415 0.314 0.217 0.199 0.039
NH 0.014 −0.042 −0.002 0.008 0.502 0.620 0.176 0.171 0.111
FL 0.031 −0.140 −0.005 0.012 0.758 0.304 0.198 0.187 0.036
KS 0.050 −0.081 −0.006 0.010 1.464 0.493 0.233 0.221 0.021
OK 0.055 −0.053 −0.008 0.012 0.215 0.591 0.245 0.227 0.059
MD 0.055 −0.133 −0.006 0.014 0.577 0.328 0.210 0.197 0.067
AL 0.066 −0.104 −0.004 0.013 1.771 0.380 0.253 0.247 0.047
CA 0.068 −0.236 −0.007 0.018 2.310 0.375 0.237 0.223 0.044
ID 0.076 −0.074 −0.013 0.015 1.493 0.188 0.223 0.201 0.040
NC 0.099 −0.051 −0.008 0.011 2.079 0.418 0.187 0.174 0.026
ND 0.101 −0.007 −0.016 0.015 −2.242 0.449 0.287 0.256 0.048
SD 0.121 −0.009 −0.010 0.015 0.819 0.154 0.212 0.194 0.079
OR 0.131 −0.092 −0.012 0.024 2.205 0.399 0.251 0.229 0.099
WY 0.148 −0.013 −0.028 0.032 −2.745 0.590 0.303 0.247 0.046
UT 0.227 −0.136 −0.006 0.016 1.649 0.614 0.210 0.197 0.044
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
State-Level Fiscal Policy
Panel B. State Government Deficit Characteristics (continued)
Budget Deficit
Correlation
Alternative Std. Revenue/ Average Average
State FPB FPB Mean Dev. Skewness Expenditure Revenue Expenditure Debt
CO 0.248 −0.142 −0.008 0.015 2.734 0.775 0.183 0.170 0.026
MS 0.278 −0.023 −0.009 0.015 1.063 0.542 0.300 0.281 0.047
Average −0.014 −0.106 −0.008 0.016 1.117 0.442 0.238 0.223 0.061
FPB correlation 0.532 −0.223 0.040 −0.180 0.140 −0.089 −0.154 −0.178
Countercyclical −0.239 −0.253 −0.007 0.019 2.163 0.414 0.271 0.254 0.053
Procyclical 0.206 −0.081 −0.012 0.020 0.981 0.584 0.249 0.225 0.052









No. of obs. 2,208 2,208
Adj. R 2 0.359 0.385
Panel A of Table 1 reports that a Republican is more likely to be governor in
a procyclical state based on the 0.517 correlation between FPB and the fraction
of the sample period during which a state’s governor is a Republican. Procyclical
states are more likely to have periods of negative GSP growth according to BUST
Fraction.
The fiscal policy betas have a 0.243 correlation with the volatility of eco-
nomic growth and a 0.261 correlation with consumption volatility. These positive
correlations suggest that countercyclical states have less variability in their eco-
nomic output and consumption. We control for GSP volatility in our later empir-
ical tests and examine consumption risk in the next section. Besides economic
uncertainty, we construct a proxy for political uncertainty using the number of
state-level transitions in the governor’s political affiliation. The relation between
a governor’s political affiliation and fiscal policy is confirmed in a later empirical
test.
States have adopted budget-stabilization funds to mitigate both the finan-
cial constraints imposed by their respective balanced-budget amendments and the
policy uncertainty that could arise from higher budget deficits. In unreported re-
sults, state-level balanced-budget amendments were previously used to explain
state-level fiscal policy. However, these budget amendments were often adopted
before the U.S. Civil War. In contrast, budget-stabilization funds reflect more
contemporary political decisions. Because the deposit rules governing a state’s
budget-stabilization fund do not vary with economic conditions, these rules are
suitable instruments for state-level fiscal policy. Wagner and Elder (2005) de-
scribe the deposit rules governing these “rainy day” accounts and enumerate their
stringency on a scale of 1 (weak) to 4 (strong). Along with Knight and Levinson
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(1999), these authors conclude that the deposit rules of budget stabilization funds
institutionalize government savings.
In practice, deposit rules usually require a minimum percentage of a state’s
revenue to be deposited into its budget-stabilization fund. Following withdrawals
from the budget-stabilization fund, the deposit rules also specify repayment pro-
visions to ensure the fund is replenished to a prescribed maximum. Intuitively,
stringent deposit rules facilitate more countercyclical fiscal policies through the
accumulation of precautionary savings.
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the mean, standard deviation, and skewness
of state-level budget deficits. Because positive values of DEFICIT signify a budget
deficit, countercyclical states have smaller average budget surpluses. This prop-
erty can be explained by their larger budget-stabilization fund deposits, which are
included in government expenditures.7 Moreover, the skewness results indicate
that countercyclical states are willing to tolerate larger budget deficits. The cor-
relation between state-level government revenue and expenditures in Panel B is
also higher in countercyclical states. Intuitively, maintaining or increasing expen-
ditures in poor economic conditions reduces the correlation between a counter-
cyclical state’s expenditures and its revenue while inducing a positive skewness
in its budget deficit.
The −0.089 correlation between FPB and revenue and the −0.154 correla-
tion between FPB and expenditures in Panel B of Table 1 suggest that counter-
cyclical states have higher expenditures and taxes as a fraction of their respective
GSPs. Although the −0.178 correlation between a state’s fiscal policy beta and
its outstanding debt-to-GSP ratio is consistent with countercyclical states hav-
ing more debt, this debt averages 6.1% of GSP due to balanced-budget amend-
ments. This average is far below the federal government’s debt-to-GDP ratio.
Consequently, countercyclical fiscal policies at the state level are unlikely to in-
duce high levels of tax uncertainty.
The limited cross-sectional variation in debt across states can be attributed
to budget-stabilization funds financing countercyclical fiscal policies. The deposit
rules (DR) of each state’s respective budget-stabilization fund and its tendency
to elect a Republican governor (REP GOV) are examined in the context of fiscal
policy using the following cross-sectional regression:
(3) FPBi = α0+α1DRi +α2REP GOVi + εi .
We define the fitted values from equation (3) as predicted fiscal policy betas,
which are denoted F̂PB. Although F̂PB depends on the frequency of electing a
Republican governor during the entire sample period, there is no look-ahead bias
in later empirical tests because our empirical analysis does not formulate a trad-
ing strategy to exploit cross-sectional return differences based on fiscal policy. In-
stead, the cross-sectional relation between fiscal policy and returns over the long
term is the focus of our study.
7Withdrawals from the budget-stabilization fund can increase a state government’s expenditures,
and hence its budget deficit, without the corresponding issuance of debt. However, because with-
drawals depend on the previous accumulation of funds, we focus our analysis on deposit rules.
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The negative coefficient of−0.0386 (t-statistic=−16.90) for DR in Panel C
of Table 1 indicates that more stringent deposit rules are associated with counter-
cyclical fiscal policies. Furthermore, the positive coefficient of 0.2939 (t-statistic
= 33.05) for REP GOV indicates that Democratic governors are also associated
with countercyclical fiscal policies. Ranking states according to FPB and F̂PB
produces a similar ordering. Indeed, 10 of the top 15 countercyclical states are
identical under both rankings, and their correlation exceeds 0.50. The alternative
fiscal policy betas are also similar to their predicted counterparts. Thus, investors
are not required to estimate their state’s fiscal policy beta provided they under-
stand the two important determinants of its fiscal policy that explain nearly 40%
of the variation in state-level fiscal policy according to the R2 metrics in Panel C.
III. Fiscal Policy and Consumption Risk
According to Ricardian equivalence, government budget deficits cannot
stimulate consumption because households increase savings in anticipation of fu-
ture tax increases. However, higher government spending can stabilize consump-
tion during poor economic conditions due to household borrowing constraints
(Zeldes (1989)) and difficulties in hedging unemployment (Hubbard, Skinner,
and Zeldes (1994)). Moreover, at the state level, balanced-budget amendments
and budget-stabilization funds reduce the association between debt issuance and
countercyclical fiscal policy.
To determine whether countercyclical fiscal policies lower consumption risk,
our state-level proxy for consumption is retail sales (Ostergaard, Sorensen, and
Yosha (2002)). Following Korniotis (2008), retail sales data on non-durables are
scaled upward to account for services. The annual scale factor equals aggregate
per capita consumption in the United States divided by average per capita retail
sales.
To examine the relation between state-level consumption risk and fiscal pol-
icy, we estimate the following panel regression:
(4) CONSUMPTIONi ,t = β11BUSTi ,t +β2FPBi +β3(1BUSTi ,t ×FPBi )+ εi ,t .
The indicator variable 1BUSTi ,t equals 1 in year t if state i has negative GSP growth
relative to year t−1. The specification in equation (4) also includes year fixed
effects and state fixed effects, with the inclusion of state fixed effects requiring
the removal of the state-level fiscal policy beta. This specification is also esti-
mated after replacing the FPB values with their predicted counterparts F̂PB from
equation (3). Recall that the predicted fiscal policy betas capture salient aspects
of each state’s fiscal policy that investors can condition on when evaluating their
consumption risk.8
A negative β1 coefficient indicates that consumption growth decreases during
bust periods. More important, a negative β3 coefficient indicates that consumption
declines less during bust periods in states that implement countercyclical fiscal
8The estimation is conducted using a generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure with the
second stage accounting for the estimation error in the first stage. However, the results are similar
using 2-stage least squares (2SLS) and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML).
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policies. According to Panel A of Table 2, without state fixed effects, the β3 co-
efficient for the interaction term in equation (4) is negative, equaling −0.1215
(t-statistic=−5.03). Thus, a more countercyclical fiscal policy is associated with
a smaller decline in consumption during bust periods, and hence lower consump-
tion risk. With the fiscal policy beta having a standard deviation of 0.121, the
TABLE 2
Fiscal Policy and Consumption Risk
Panel A of Table 2 reports on the sensitivity of state-level consumption to each state’s fiscal policy beta, as estimated by
equation (4):
CONSUMPTIONi ,t = β11BUSTi ,t +β2FPBi +β3(1BUSTi ,t ×FPBi )+ εi ,t .
The indicator variable BUST equals 1 if gross state product (GSP) growth in state i is negative in year t relative to the
prior year, and 0 otherwise. The panel regression in equation (4) is also estimated using each state’s predicted fiscal
policy beta from equation (3), F̂PB. These specifications include year fixed effects and state fixed effects, with state fixed
effects requiring the removal of the state-level fiscal policy betas. Panel B reports the results of a similar panel regression
that replaces a state’s fiscal policy beta with its political uncertainty. POLITICAL_UNCERTAINTY in a state equals the
number of transitions between Democratic and Republican (Republican and Democratic) governors during our sample.
Standard errors are clustered at the state-level. t -statistics are reported below each of the estimates in italics. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Fiscal Policy and Consumption Risk
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
BUST −0.0280*** −0.0294*** −0.0265*** −0.0264*** −0.0380*** −0.0400*** −0.0464*** −0.0507***
−5.87 −5.20 −5.29 −5.02 −6.74 −7.29 −6.94 −8.56
FPB 0.0262***
3.32












BUST × −0.2074*** −0.2532***
ALTERNATIVE_F̂PB −3.72 −5.13
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
No. of obs. 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300
Adj. R 2 0.725 0.754 0.724 0.754 0.724 0.754 0.724 0.754
Panel B. Political Uncertainty and Consumption Risk
Variable 1 2 3 4
BUST −0.0208** −0.0118 −0.0225** −0.0220**
−2.11 −0.96 −2.20 −2.05
POLITICAL_UNCERTAINTY 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007
0.84 0.76 0.82
BUST × POLITICAL_UNCERTAINTY −0.0020 −0.0044* −0.0019 −0.0020





Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes No No
No. of obs. 2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300
Adj. R 2 0.721 0.753 0.723 0.723
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−0.1215 coefficient implies a 1.47% smaller decline in consumption during bust
periods in the more countercyclical state.
The predicted fiscal policy betas confirm the importance of fiscal policy to
consumption risk. The interaction variable involving F̂PBi has a negative β3 coef-
ficient equaling −0.1580 (t-statistic = −3.93) when F̂PB rather than state fixed
effects are included in the specification. The alternative fiscal policy betas produce
an even smaller decline in consumption during bust periods because the interac-
tion variable has a negative β3 coefficient equaling−0.1433 (t-statistic=−3.65).
State governments may attempt to optimize their fiscal policy based on a
trade-off between higher consumption growth versus lower consumption risk.
This trade-off is consistent with the positive β2 coefficients in Panel A of Table 2,
which indicate that consumption growth is higher in procyclical states. Intuitively,
lower consumption growth may be the cost of a countercyclical fiscal policy that
lowers consumption risk. Because the magnitude of the β3 coefficient is 4.64 times
larger than that of the β2 coefficient, consumption growth is approximately 0.32%
lower per year to obtain the 1.47% smaller decline in consumption during bust
periods.
Finally, to capture the policy uncertainty associated with countercyclical fis-
cal policies, we replace FPB in equation (4) with the political uncertainty vari-
able that measures the number of transitions in each state governor’s political
affiliation.9
The results in Panel B of Table 2 indicate that the interaction between po-
litical uncertainty and the indicator function for bust periods has an insignifi-
cant coefficient. Indeed, the β2 and β3 coefficients are consistently insignificant.
Therefore, unlike fiscal policy, political uncertainty does not appear to influence
consumption growth or consumption risk.
IV. Return Implications of Fiscal Policy
Variation in consumption risk across states can have cross-sectional return
implications if investors have a local investment bias. Insufficient risk sharing
within the United States due to poor diversification has been reported by Korniotis
(2008) and Korniotis and Kumar (2013).
We first compute a firm-level local investor base measure. Individual firms
are matched with specific states using the location of their headquarters in
Compustat. The location of institutional investors is obtained from Nelson’s
Directory of Investment Managers. Korniotis and Kumar (2013) document that
individual investors have a similar local bias as institutional investors. This find-
ing is consistent with the portfolio decisions of institutional investors reflecting
the investment preferences of their clients.
An institution has a local investment bias in a nearby firm (headquartered in
the same state) if its aggregate portfolio weight in this firm is at least 20% greater
9To clarify, the frequency of electing a Republican governor differs from political uncertainty
because both a low and a high frequency suggest low political uncertainty. Furthermore, a frequency
near 50% does not indicate whether voters change the political affiliation of their governor once, in
a permanent political shift from one political party to another, or whether the governor’s political
affiliation alternates between elections and causes policy uncertainty.
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than its market portfolio weight. A firm has a local investor base if at least 5% of
its shares are held by institutions with a local investment bias.
To determine whether countercyclical fiscal policies lower the risk-adjusted
returns of firms with a local investor base, the following panel regression is
estimated:
(5) RETURNk,t = β0+β1FPBi + γSFt + εk,t .
The dependent variable refers to firm-level returns that have a local investor base
in state i . Thus, all firms indexed by k are headquartered in state i . Returns are
risk-adjusted using the methodology of Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997), although unreported results are similar for industry-adjusted returns. The
fiscal policy betas in equation (5) are replaced with their respective predicted
values from equation (3). SFt contains state and firm characteristics. To capture
cross-sectional variation in state-level industrial composition, the state character-
istics are average economic growth and the volatility of economic growth (mea-
sured as the standard deviation of annual GSP growth). The firm characteristics,
which are computed each year, include institutional ownership (IO), capital asset
pricing model beta (CAPM BETA), idiosyncratic return volatility (IVOL), book-
to-market (BM) ratio, market capitalization (SIZE), and the firm’s return over the
prior 12 months after omitting the most recent month (PRET).
A positive β1 coefficient indicates that stock returns are lower in counter-
cyclical states for firms with a local investor base. Specifically, a positive β1 co-
efficient is consistent with the discount-rate channel. To clarify, the discount-rate
channel consists of a joint hypothesis. First, countercyclical fiscal policies are pre-
dicted to lower the consumption risk of investors. Second, this lower consumption
risk is predicted to lower the returns of firms that have a local investor base.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the results from equation (5) for firms whose insti-
tutional investor base has at least a 5% local bias. On average, this local-investor-
base restriction yields 666 firms in 43 states. The results in Panel B further restrict
this subset to a 7% minimum local base that contains an average of 491 firms
in 41 states. The discount-rate channel predicts a larger β1 coefficient in Panel B
compared with Panel A under the more stringent local base threshold. Conversely,
in Panel C, the estimation is performed on all firms regardless of whether their in-
vestor base has a local bias. Thus, the discount-rate channel predicts a smaller β1
coefficient in Panel C compared with Panel A.
According to Panel A of Table 3, β1 equals 0.0583 (t-statistic = 2.54) in the
full specification with all control variables. Thus, for firms with a local investor
base, a higher fiscal policy beta, which corresponds to a less countercyclical fiscal
policy (more procyclical fiscal policy), is associated with higher returns. The β1
coefficient increases to 0.1197 (t-statistic = 4.41) when FPB is replaced by its
predicted value, F̂PB.
In terms of the β1=0.0583 coefficient’s economic significance in Panel A
of Table 3, the standard deviation of FPB in Table 1 across all 50 states is 0.121.
Thus, a 1-standard-deviation difference in the fiscal policy beta implies an annual
return difference of 0.70% if at least 5% of a firm’s investor base has a local
bias. This deviation is approximately the difference between the 10th and 90th
percentiles of FPB. Furthermore, the 0.445 difference in the average fiscal policy
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beta between the 5 most countercyclical states and the 5 most procyclical states
produces a return difference of 2.59% per year. Thus, the impact of fiscal policy
on a firm’s cost of equity is economically significant.
For firms with a more salient local investor base, the β1 coefficient increases
in magnitude to 0.0919 (t-statistic = 2.31) according to Panel B of Table 3.
Therefore, countercyclical fiscal policies appear to lower stock returns via the
discount-rate channel, with a more salient local investment bias increasing the
sensitivity of stock returns to state-level fiscal policy. A similar increase in
the β1 coefficient is found for the predicted fiscal policy betas. The alternative
TABLE 3
Fiscal Policy and Stock Returns
Table 3 reports the results from the Fama–MacBeth (1973) regression in equation (5):
RETURNk ,t = β0 +β1FPBi + γSFt + εk ,t ,
which examines the return implications of fiscal policy for firms whose investors have a local investment bias. The state-
level fiscal policy betas are measured according to equation (2) as the sensitivity of annual budget deficits to economic
conditions. An alternative fiscal policy beta (ALTERNATIVE_FPB) is estimated by including a state’s unemployment rate
and its growth in personal income as independent variables in equation (2). Predicted fiscal policy betas are defined in
equation (3) using budget-stabilization fund deposit rules and the frequency of Republican governors. SFt contains state
and firm characteristics. The state characteristics include each state’s average GSP growth (GSP_GROWTH) and the
volatility of this growth (GSP_VOLATILITY). Annual firm characteristics include institutional ownership (IO), capital asset
pricing model beta (CAPM_BETA), idiosyncratic return volatility (IVOL), book-to-market (BM) ratio, market capitalization
(SIZE), and past returns over the prior year (PRET). Institutional investors have a local investment bias if the aggregate
portfolio weight they assign to local firms (firms headquartered in the same state as their location) is at least 20% greater
than the aggregate market portfolio weight of local firms. In Panel A, firms have a local investor base if at least 5% of their
shares are held by institutions with a local investment bias. On average, this subset consists of 666 firms in 43 states.
The results in Panel B pertain to a smaller subset averaging 491 firms in 41 states in which at least 7% of a firm’s shares
are held by institutions with a local investment bias. Panel C reports the results for the entire sample of firms. t -statistics
are below each of the estimates in italics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8









IO −0.0977*** −0.0997*** −0.1009*** −0.0997*** −0.0966*** −0.0989*** −0.1007*** −0.0990***
−3.59 −3.82 −3.89 −3.82 −2.83 −3.03 −3.11 −3.03
CAPM_BETA 0.0048 0.0061 0.0066 0.0061 0.0068 0.0080 0.0080 0.0079
0.28 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.45 0.51 0.53 0.51
IVOL −0.0573 −0.0561 −0.0558 −0.0562 −0.0527 −0.0512 −0.0507 −0.0513
−1.56 −1.50 −1.54 −1.51 −1.59 −1.51 −1.55 −1.51
GSP_GROWTH 0.1663 0.2128 0.1387 0.2033 0.1130 0.1917 0.1022 0.1796
0.65 0.80 0.48 0.76 0.44 0.74 0.35 0.68
GSP_VOLATILITY −0.0370 0.2144 0.1214 0.1833 −0.0538 0.2093 0.2014 0.1740
−0.06 0.31 0.10 0.27 −0.09 0.30 0.17 0.25
BM −0.0026 −0.0032 −0.0032 −0.0033
−0.37 −0.45 −0.45 −0.45
SIZE 0.0017 0.0015 0.0017 0.0015
0.85 0.80 0.93 0.80
PRET −0.0024 −0.0024 −0.0020 −0.0024
−0.11 −0.11 −0.09 −0.11
Intercept −0.1244 −0.1828 −0.0909 −0.1547 −0.0927 −0.1823 −0.0810 −0.1522
−0.47 −0.65 −0.30 −0.54 −0.36 −0.67 −0.27 −0.55
Adj. R 2 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.039 0.038 0.039 0.038
(continued on next page)
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Fiscal Policy and Stock Returns
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8







ALTERNATIVE_ F̂PB 0.2433*** 0.2410***
7.45 7.14
IO −0.1025*** −0.1041*** −0.1053*** −0.1044*** −0.1031*** −0.1055*** −0.1069*** −0.1059***
−5.14 −5.73 −5.85 −5.73 −3.94 −4.55 −4.69 −4.56
CAPM_BETA 0.0060 0.0077 0.0088 0.0076 0.0104 0.0120 0.0130 0.0119
0.43 0.55 0.67 0.55 0.74 0.84 0.94 0.83
IVOL −0.0644 −0.0636 −0.0623 −0.0638 −0.0618 −0.0608 −0.0593 −0.0609
−1.37 −1.33 −1.31 −1.33 −1.33 −1.28 −1.26 −1.29
GSP_GROWTH 0.1610 0.2008 0.1542 0.1923 0.1996 0.2682 0.2074 0.2574
0.54 0.61 0.52 0.59 0.67 0.86 0.73 0.83
GSP_VOLATILITY −0.3149 0.1909 −0.3429 0.1447 −0.3861 0.1801 −0.3436 0.1227
−0.65 0.20 −0.22 0.16 −0.81 0.19 −0.24 0.13
BM 0.0070 0.0057 0.0059 0.0057
0.77 0.60 0.64 0.60
SIZE 0.0027 0.0023 0.0025 0.0023
1.10 1.06 1.19 1.08
PRET −0.0044 −0.0046 −0.0040 −0.0046
−0.24 −0.25 −0.22 −0.25
Intercept −0.1086 −0.1684 −0.0837 −0.1340 −0.1901 −0.2759 −0.1798 −0.2393
−0.33 −0.48 −0.27 −0.39 −0.61 −0.85 −0.62 −0.75
Adj. R 2 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.032 0.045 0.044 0.046 0.044









IO −0.1131*** −0.1139*** −0.1143*** −0.1140 −0.1202*** −0.1207*** −0.1210*** −0.1208***
−5.01 −5.04 −5.12 −5.03 −4.07 −4.10 −4.16 −4.09
CAPM_BETA 0.0124 0.0125 0.0126 0.0125 0.0108 0.0109 0.0109 0.0110
0.75 0.76 0.78 0.76 0.67 0.67 0.69 0.67
IVOL −0.0557** −0.0556** −0.0556** −0.0556** −0.0562** −0.0560** −0.0561** −0.0560**
−2.43 −2.43 −2.45 −2.43 −2.21 −2.20 −2.22 −2.20
GSP_GROWTH 0.7218*** 0.8012** 0.8082*** 0.7887** 0.7113*** 0.8020** 0.8016** 0.7891**
2.74 2.57 2.66 2.49 2.62 2.49 2.57 2.41
GSP_VOLATILITY −0.8232 −0.6895 −0.6635 −0.7277 −0.8418 −0.6757 −0.5971 −0.7161
−1.29 −1.14 −0.86 −1.22 −1.36 −1.14 −0.79 −1.22
BM −0.0034 −0.0035 −0.0035 −0.0035
−0.94 −0.93 −0.96 −0.94
SIZE 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036 0.0036
1.12 1.09 1.09 1.09
PRET 0.0009 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011
0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09
Intercept −0.6926** −0.7803** −0.7890** −0.7598** −0.7243** −0.8243** −0.8286** −0.8038**
−2.52 −2.33 −2.32 −2.24 −2.35 −2.21 −2.21 −2.13
Adj. R 2 0.018 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.022
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fiscal policy betas and their predicted counterparts also have larger coefficients in
Panel B under the more stringent local-investor-base criteria.
The results in Panel C of Table 3 pertain to the entire cross section of firms,
including firms whose investor base does not have a local bias. Thus, the discount-
rate channel predicts a smaller β1 coefficient in this unrestricted cross section.
Consistent with the discount-rate channel, the β1 coefficients are insignificant in
Panel C for every specification. This lack of statistical significance, despite the
larger sample size, highlights the importance of local investment bias to the rela-
tion between fiscal policy and firm-level returns, thereby lending support to the
discount-rate channel.
In unreported returns, we estimate a panel regression of firm-level stock re-
turns on state-level consumption volatility (standard deviation of annual consump-
tion growth). Higher consumption volatility does increase the equity premium
for firms with a local investor base, as the coefficient for consumption volatility
is positive. However, this analysis does not explicitly condition on fiscal policy.
Indeed, besides fiscal policy, consumption volatility is influenced by other factors,
such as economic volatility.
A. Political Uncertainty
A large literature finds that government intervention in the economy can in-
crease policy uncertainty. For example, government budget deficits can increase
uncertainty regarding future taxation. According to Panel A of Table 1, polit-
ical uncertainty has a −0.191 correlation with FPB. This negative correlation
indicates that countercyclical states have greater political uncertainty. However,
there is no relation between political uncertainty and either consumption or out-
put volatility. In particular, the correlation between political uncertainty and con-
sumption volatility is −0.012, whereas the correlation between political uncer-
tainty and GSP volatility is 0.021.
Although our study examines the return predictability attributable to the pre-
dictable component of fiscal policy, we reestimate the Fama–MacBeth (1973) re-
gression in equation (5) with the political uncertainty variable included as an ad-
ditional control. Table 4 reports that controlling for political uncertainty does not
eliminate the importance of fiscal policy to stock returns. At the 5% local bias
threshold, the β1 coefficient for FPB remains positive, equaling 0.0688 (t-statistic
= 2.33) after the inclusion of political uncertainty. The magnitude of this coeffi-
cient does not decrease with the inclusion of political uncertainty. Furthermore,
increasing the local bias threshold in the investor base to 7% confirms the impor-
tance of fiscal policy. In particular, both FPB and its predicted counterpart F̂PB
have significant β1 coefficients. These results also apply to the alternative fiscal
policy betas that control for unemployment and income growth.
The impact of political uncertainty on returns is less consistent. In particu-
lar, both political uncertainty and the predicted fiscal policy betas have a common
dependence on the political affiliation of a state’s governor. Nonetheless, the re-
sults at the 7% local bias threshold suggest that fiscal policy is more important
to stock returns than political uncertainty. For example, the coefficient for F̂PB is
positive, 0.1280 (t-statistic = 2.06), whereas the coefficient for political uncer-
tainty is insignificant, 0.0038 (t-statistic = 1.16).
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TABLE 4
Political Uncertainty, Fiscal Policy, and Stock Returns
Table 4 reports the results from the Fama–MacBeth (1973) regression in equation (5) that examines the return implica-
tions of fiscal policy with an additional control variable for political uncertainty. The political uncertainty variable (POLITI-
CAL_UNCERTAINTY) equals the number of state-level transitions from a Republican governor to a Democratic governor
and, vice versa, from a Democratic governor to a Republican governor. State-level fiscal policy betas are measured
according to equation (2) as the sensitivity of annual budget deficits to economic conditions. An alternative fiscal policy
beta (ALTERNATIVE_FPB) is estimated by including a state’s unemployment rate and its growth in personal income as
independent variables in equation (2). Predicted fiscal policy betas are defined in equation (3) using budget-stabilization
fund deposit rules and the frequency of Republican governors. State characteristics in this analysis include each state’s
average gross state product (GSP) growth (GSP_GROWTH) and the volatility of this growth (GSP_VOLATILITY). Annual
firm characteristics include institutional ownership (IO), capital asset pricing model beta (CAPM_BETA), idiosyncratic re-
turn volatility (IVOL), book-to-market (BM) ratio, market capitalization (SIZE), and past returns over the prior year (PRET).
Institutional investors have a local investment bias if the aggregate portfolio weight they assign to local firms (firms head-
quartered in the same state as their location) is at least 20% greater than the aggregate market portfolio weight of local
firms. The 5% and 7% minimum thresholds apply to the percentage of shares held by institutions with a local investment
bias. t -statistics are below each of the estimates in italics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. 5% Threshold Panel B. 7% Threshold









POLITICAL_UNCERTAINTY 0.0073*** 0.0078** 0.0086** 0.0072 0.0045** 0.0038 0.0057** 0.0029
2.79 2.00 2.28 1.53 2.46 1.16 2.72 0.92
IO −0.110*** −0.1129*** −0.1141*** −0.1130*** −0.1054*** −0.1093*** −0.1109*** −0.1097***
−3.36 −4.01 −3.74 −3.69 −3.96 −4.79 −4.81 −4.80
CAPM_BETA 0.0104 0.0115 0.0118 0.0116 0.0110 0.0120 0.0129 0.0122
0.69 1.29 0.82 0.79 1.11 1.22 1.34 1.23
IVOL −0.0560 −0.0563 −0.0544 −0.0563 −0.0605 −0.0605 −0.0581 −0.0607
−1.41 −1.55 −1.36 −1.35 −1.38 −1.33 −1.33 −1.33
GSP_GROWTH 0.2740 0.2605 0.2079 0.2437 0.3390 0.3635 0.2923 0.3420
1.07 1.22 0.76 0.90 1.39 1.45 1.29 1.36
GSP_VOLATILITY −0.7166 −0.0452 −0.5750 −0.0981 −0.3154 0.2384 −0.5276 0.1576
−1.27 −0.08 −0.53 −0.13 −0.80 0.25 −0.42 0.17
BM 0.0035 0.0028 0.0027 0.0027 0.0073 0.0058 0.0059 0.0058
0.45 0.36 0.33 0.33 0.88 0.67 0.71 0.66
SIZE 0.0024 0.0024 0.0025 0.0024 0.0029 0.0028 0.0029 0.0028
1.17 1.59 1.30 1.22 1.34 1.44 1.54 1.45
PRET −0.0033 −0.0035 −0.0031 −0.0035 −0.0049 −0.0048 −0.0048 −0.0049
−0.16 −0.17 −0.15 −0.17 −0.27 −0.26 −0.27 −0.26
Intercept −0.2825 −0.2944 −0.2109 −0.2588 −0.3631 −0.4005 −0.2914 −0.3509
−1.09 −1.37 −0.76 −0.93 −1.40 −1.69 −1.39 −1.49
Adj. R2 0.045 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.047
B. Aggregate Fiscal Policy of Investor Base
Our next analysis computes a firm-level investor-base beta denoted IB FPB
using institutional investor holdings and the FPB of each investor’s location. The
investor-base beta reduces the dependence of our results on local investment bias
by allowing a firm’s investor base to span several states. For a firm held by in-
vestors located in multiple states, IB FPB weights each state’s fiscal policy beta
(predicted fiscal policy beta) by the fraction of its investor base located in the
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state.10 Thus, IB FPB examines the aggregate fiscal policy affecting a firm’s in-
vestor base instead of focusing on the fiscal policy affecting its local investors.
Because IB FPB is irrelevant if the combined portfolio holdings of institu-
tional investors in a firm is too small, institutional ownership is required to be
above a 30% threshold. This minimum threshold parallels the earlier firm-level
local bias filter that required institutional investors to overweight a firm relative
to its market portfolio weight. The 30% threshold creates a subset of 1,252 stocks
in 48 states on average. This subset is considerably larger than the local-investor-
base subset underlying Panel A of Table 3.11 A more stringent 40% minimum for
institutional ownership reduces the subset to an average of 905 firms across 48
states.
We then reestimate equation (5) with the firm-level IB FPB replacing the
state-level FPB:
(6) RETURNk,t = β0+β1IB FPBk + γSFt + εk,t .
This specification does not assume any local investor bias. Instead, any firm with
sufficient institutional ownership is included in this analysis, with IB FPB repre-
senting the aggregate fiscal policy of its investor base.
A positive β1 coefficient indicates that returns are lower for firms whose
investor bases are located in countercyclical states. Panel A of Table 5 reports
positive β1 coefficients for firms with at least 30% institutional ownership. In the
full specification with all control variables, the β1 coefficient is 0.3170 (t-statistic
= 4.40). This β1 coefficient increases to 1.0309 (t-stat. = 4.85) for the predicted
fiscal policy betas. These β1 coefficients indicate that having an investor base
concentrated in countercyclical states lowers a firm’s cost of equity.
Panel B of Table 5 reports larger β1 coefficients when institutional owner-
ship is required to exceed a 40% minimum threshold. Specifically, the β1 coef-
ficient increases to 0.4020 (t-statistic = 4.90). The stronger result is consistent
with IB FPB capturing the fiscal policy exposure of a firm’s investor base more
accurately because institutional portfolio holdings are more relevant in this subset
of firms.
C. Investment Sensitivity to Fiscal Policy
Although our study is intended to examine the investor-level implications
of fiscal policy, state-level fiscal policy may have implications for corporate
investment. The lower cost of equity in countercyclical states versus the higher
consumption growth in procyclical states creates a trade-off for firms.
However, firms can obtain equity financing from investors throughout the
United States. Thus, the fiscal policy of the state in which a firm is headquar-
tered does not necessarily determine its cost of equity. Indeed, a firm’s headquar-
ters may appear in a procyclical state due to its higher consumption growth, ac-
cess to natural resources, favorable regulation, or other considerations. With a
local investment bias, firms headquartered in a procyclical state have a higher
10Our analysis of long-term returns allows for heterogeneity in the prevailing economic conditions
of states during each period. This heterogeneity is more important for the cash-flow channel.
11In unreported results, intersecting the 5% minimum local-investment-bias filter with the 30%
institutional ownership filter reduces the average number of stocks from 1,252 to 461.
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TABLE 5
Aggregate Fiscal Policy of Investor Base and Stock Returns
Table 5 reports the results from the Fama–MacBeth (1973) regression in equation (6) that examines the return implications
of a firm’s aggregate exposure to fiscal policy through its investor base. The location of every institutional investor that
owns a firm’s stock determines its investor-base fiscal policy beta, denoted IB_PB. Specifically, this firm-specific aggre-
gate fiscal policy beta is computed by weighting the fiscal policy beta (predicted fiscal policy beta) of each state by
the percentage of a firm’s institutional investors in the respective state. The state-level fiscal policy betas are measured
according to equation (2) as the sensitivity of annual budget deficits to economic conditions. Predicted fiscal policy betas
are defined in equation (3) using budget-stabilization fund deposit rules and the frequency of Republican governors. State
characteristics in this analysis include each state’s average gross state product (GSP) growth (GSP_GROWTH) and the
volatility of this growth (GSP_VOLATILITY). Annual firm characteristics include institutional ownership (IO), capital asset
pricing model beta (CAPM_BETA), idiosyncratic return volatility (IVOL), book-to-market (BM) ratio, market capitalization
(SIZE), and past returns over the prior year (PRET). The results in Panel A impose a 30% minimum threshold on insti-
tutional investment, whereas those in Panel B impose a 40% threshold. t -statistics are below each of the estimates in
italics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable 1 2 3 4





IO −0.0256** −0.0233* −0.0294*** −0.0279**
−2.23 −1.76 −2.84 −2.38
CAPM_BETA −0.0127 −0.0090 −0.0137 −0.0098
−0.76 −0.53 −0.85 −0.62
IVOL −0.1303*** −0.1297*** −0.1194*** −0.1199***
−5.19 −5.04 −4.34 −4.27
GSP_GROWTH 0.2932 0.3289 0.2805 0.3161
1.39 1.44 1.28 1.35
GSP_VOLATILITY −0.3361 −0.3769 −0.3501 −0.3984







Intercept −0.2553 −0.2426 −0.3282 −0.3057
−1.07 −1.00 −1.13 −1.05
Adj. R2 0.031 0.033 0.042 0.044





IO 0.0262 0.0265 0.0333 0.0331
0.74 0.84 0.92 1.04
CAPM_BETA −0.0292 −0.0224 −0.0305 −0.0235
−1.42 −1.10 −1.57 −1.26
IVOL −0.1585*** −0.1588*** −0.1360*** −0.1337***
−4.28 −4.14 −3.46 −3.47
GSP_GROWTH 0.2044 0.2885 0.2077 0.2786
0.68 0.95 0.69 0.93
GSP_VOLATILITY −0.0431 −0.1787 −0.0251 −0.1473







Intercept −0.1804 −0.1897 −0.3454 −0.3461
−0.57 −0.63 −0.98 −1.05
Adj. R2 0.047 0.051 0.064 0.069
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discount rate because (undiversified) local investors require a higher equity return
premium. In response, these firms can target equity investors in countercycli-
cal states to take advantage of their lower required equity return premium. This
investor-base diversification is especially important for capital-intensive firms
whose investments are sensitive to their respective discount rates. To clarify, the
preference of local investors for local equity securities is not an advantage for
firms headquartered in procyclical states because investors in these states require
a higher equity return premium.
Because firms headquartered in a procyclical state have the ability to obtain
financing from investors in countercyclical states to fund their capital expenditures
(CAPEX), we estimate the following specification:
(7) CAPEXk,t = β0+β1[FPBi − IB FPBk] + γFCt + εk,t ,
whose dependent variable is capital expenditures normalized by total assets. Firms
indexed by k are headquartered in state i . The firm characteristics contained in
FC include controls for leverage and market-to-book ratios. Industry fixed effects
based on 2-digit Standard Industrial Classification codes are also included, along
with year fixed effects. In unreported results, the β1 coefficients are consistently
positive. Thus, capital-intensive firms headquartered in a procyclical state (high
FPB) attract equity investment from countercyclical states.
Note that firms headquartered in procyclical states with lower investment
opportunities are less concerned about local investment bias, whereas capital-
intensive firms have a stronger incentive to mitigate local bias in their investor
base. Thus, not every firm will aggressively pursue equity financing from investors
in countercyclical states.
D. Headquarters Relocations
Assuming a local investment bias, relocations of firm headquarters provide
a quasi-natural experiment to analyze the impact of fiscal policy on average stock
returns. During the 1986–2006 period, 1,265 firms change the state in which they
are headquartered, according to Compact Disclosure. We observe an even split
between the number of firms relocating to states with more countercyclical and
less countercyclical fiscal policies. Relocations also occur in an array of differ-
ent industries. Firms are required to have 3 years of returns before and after their
headquarters relocation. The first year’s post-relocation return following a head-
quarters relocation is omitted to mitigate the possible influence of takeover pre-
miums associated with mergers and acquisitions.
We compute firm-level average returns before and after headquarters reloca-
tions. For firms that relocated their headquarters, these average return differences
are then regressed on changes in the fiscal policy beta associated with a relocation
of firm k’s headquarters from state i to state j :
(8) RETURNk, j ,t+−RETURNk,i ,t− = β0+β11FPBk,t + γ1Si , j + εk ,
where 1FPBk,t is defined as the difference in firm k’s fiscal policy beta after the
relocation compared with before the relocation, FPBk, j ,t+−FPBk,i ,t−. The notation
t+ refers to years after the relocation, and t− refers to years before the relocation
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in year t . Firms can relocate between countercyclical states, with 1FPB being
negative and positive, respectively, when the firm relocates to a more counter-
cyclical state or a less countercyclical state. 1Si , j denotes state-level differences
in GSP growth as well as GSP volatility before and after a headquarters relocation.
The positive β1 coefficients in Table 6 indicate that firms relocating to
states with more countercyclical fiscal policies subsequently have lower average
stock returns. The predicted fiscal policy betas also have positive β1 coefficients.
Overall, the return implications of headquarters relocations confirm the impor-
tance of fiscal policy to stock returns. However, the impact of a headquarters relo-
cation on a firm’s cost of equity requires a local investor bias before and after the
relocation.12
Furthermore, headquarters relocations may coincide with other corporate
events. For example, the higher consumption growth in procyclical states may
attract firms that benefit from having their headquarters located near customers.
Conversely, the lower consumption risk in countercyclical states may attract em-
ployees in volatile but high-value-added industries. Intuitively, although a head-
quarters relocation decision has discount-rate implications, other important fac-
tors, such as human capital (Romer (1990)), are relevant.
TABLE 6
Headquarter Relocations and Stock Returns
Table 6 examines firm-level average returns before and after headquarters relocations. Firm-level return differences are
regressed on changes in the fiscal policy betas (FPB) associated with the relocations of firm k from state i to state j as
in equation (8):
RETURNk ,j ,t+ −RETURNk ,i ,t− = β0 +β11FPBk ,t + γ1Si ,j + εk .
1FPBk ,t is defined as the difference in firm k ’s fiscal policy beta after the relocation compared with before the relocation,
FPBk ,j ,t+−FPBk ,i ,t−. The notation t+ refers to years after the relocation, and t− refers to years before the relocation
in year t . Firms are required to have at least 3 years of stock returns before and after their headquarters relocations.
Returns in the first year after a relocation are eliminated from RETURNk ,j ,t+ to ensure that takeover premiums arising
from mergers and acquisitions are not influencing our results. 1Si ,j denotes state-level differences in gross state product
(GSP) growth (GSP_GROWTH), as well as its volatility (GSP_VOLATILITY), before and after a headquarters relocation.
t -statistics are below each of the estimates in italics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.









1GSP_GROWTH −0.8057 −0.8069 −0.7219 −0.8272
−0.84 −0.84 −0.75 −0.87
1GSP_VOLATILITY 1.0686 2.0341 1.2809 1.7019
0.50 1.02 0.58 0.89
Intercept 0.0090 0.0061 0.0103 0.0064 0.0072 0.0046 0.0098 0.0060
0.62 0.41 0.71 0.43 0.49 0.31 0.68 0.41
No. of obs. 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816
Adj. R 2 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.014 0.016
12In unreported results, we find evidence that local investment bias does migrate with firms to their
new headquarters locations.
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E. Market Participation
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey records state-level eq-
uity market participation rates for 1989, 1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007,
and 2009. Figure 1 illustrates the decline in market participation that corresponds
to national recessions identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research




Figure 1 provides a visual illustration of market participation in procyclical states and countercyclical states during national
recessions. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) survey records state-level market participation rates for 1989,
1994, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2009. National recessions occurred during part of the following time periods:





















Consistent with countercyclical states having lower consumption risk, mar-
ket participation is less volatile in countercyclical states as a result of smaller
declines during recessions. In particular, the volatility of equity market participa-
tion in the most countercyclical states equals 2.85% compared with 5.17% in the
most procyclical states. This 2.32% reduction in market participation volatility is
significant (t-statistic = 2.59).
Figure 1 provides empirical support for the discount-rate channel. Specifi-
cally, the states with the most countercyclical fiscal policy exhibit lower consump-
tion risk than the states with the most procyclical fiscal policy. Thus, countercycli-
cal fiscal policies appear to finance investor consumption during poor economic
conditions that otherwise would have been financed by investors liquidating their
equity portfolios.
Along with the importance of investor location, the state-level equity par-
ticipation provides evidence supporting the discount-rate channel. Nonetheless,
countercyclical fiscal policies may lower stock returns by reducing cash-flow risk.
Therefore, our next analyses examine the cash-flow risk channel.
F. Cash-Flow Risk
To investigate whether countercyclical fiscal policies lower the sensitivity of
cash flow to economic conditions, we estimate the following panel regression:
(9) CASH FLOWk,t = β11BUSTi ,t +β2FPBi +β3(1BUSTi ,t ×FPBi )+ εi ,t .
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The dependent variable is the ratio of firm-level earnings normalized by total as-
sets, for all firms headquartered in state i . This specification parallels equation (4),
with state-level consumption replaced by firm-level cash flow. Year fixed effects
are included with, standard errors clustered at the firm level. State fixed effects
are also included when FPB is removed.
Unlike consumption, Table 7 indicates that cash flow does not decline less
during bust periods in countercyclical states than in procyclical states. In particu-
lar, the β3 coefficient for the interaction variable is either insignificant or positive.
An insignificant β3 coefficient is consistent with the majority of firms in our sam-
ple having diversified operations across the United States and with heterogeneity
in economic conditions across U.S. states. Furthermore, a positive β3 coefficient
indicates that firm-level cash flow declines more rather than less during bust peri-
ods in countercyclical states.
To further analyze the cash-flow channel, we utilize the data of Garcia and
Norli (2012) to examine the state-level operations of individual firms starting in
1994. Their data record instances where each state’s name occurs in a firm’s 10-K
report. Delaware and Washington are removed from the sample given the large
number of firms incorporated in Delaware and the possibility that Washington
refers to the U.S. capital rather than the state. On average, firms operate in fewer
than 10 states.
We compute firm-level cash-flow fiscal policy betas, denoted CF FPB, that
weight the state-level fiscal policy betas in which a firm operates by the frequency
of each state’s name in its 10-K report. Firms have more cash-flow exposure to
a state’s fiscal policy if they have more operations in this state. The cash-flow
TABLE 7
Fiscal Policy and Cash-Flow Risk
Table 7 reports the results from the regression in equation (9):
CASH_FLOWk ,t = β11BUSTi ,t +β2FPBi +β3(1BUSTi ,t ×FPBi )+ εi ,t ,
which examines the firm-level cash-flow implications of fiscal policy during bust periods. Firms indexed by k are head-
quartered in state i . Year fixed effects are included, as well as state fixed effects when the state-level fiscal policy betas
are excluded. The state-level fiscal policy betas are measured according to equation (2) as the sensitivity of annual bud-
get deficits to economic conditions. A bust period for a state is defined by negative gross state product (GSP) growth.
An alternative fiscal policy beta is estimated by including a state’s unemployment rate and its growth in personal income
as independent variables in equation (2). t -statistics are below each of the estimates in italics. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable 1 2 3 4
BUST −0.0052 0.0142* −0.0065 0.0156*
−0.53 1.71 −0.70 1.76
FPB −0.0337
−1.00




BUST × ALTERNATIVE_FPB −0.0598 0.0140
−1.03 0.22
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State fixed effects No Yes No Yes
No. of obs. 2,250 2,250 2,250 2,250
Adj. R 2 0.080 0.304 0.080 0.304
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betas based on fiscal policy enable us to examine the cash-flow channel using the
following Fama–MacBeth (1973) regression:
RETURNk,t = β0+β1CF FPBk,t +β2BMk,t +β3SIZEk,t(10)
+β4PRETk,t + γFCk + εk,t .
Because this Fama–MacBeth regression uses firm-level CF FPB betas, the con-
trol variables are book-to-market (BM) ratio, size (SIZE), and past return (PRET)
characteristics. The firm-level returns in equation (10) are not risk-adjusted due
to the inclusion of these firm characteristics. FCk contains the following firm
characteristics: institutional ownership (IO), the capital asset pricing model beta
(CAPM BETA), and idiosyncratic return volatility (IVOL).
A significant β1 coefficient is evidence that the cash-flow channel is respon-
sible for the return implications of fiscal policy. However, according to Panel A of
Table 8, the β1 coefficients are insignificant. The lack of empirical support for the
cash-flow channel can be attributed to firms having diversified operations. Indeed,
the cash flows of firms with diversified operations are unlikely to be affected by
the fiscal policy and economic conditions of any individual state. Therefore, we
restrict our next analysis to geographically concentrated firms whose operations
are limited to a single state.
However, our results are biased against the cash-flow channel if single-state
firms have operations in more than one state. Therefore, we refine the single-state
classification of Garcia and Norli (2012) for our purposes by applying two addi-
tional filters that eliminate firms using the following two criteria: i) firm describes
itself as operating in multiple states but does not specifically mention their names,
ii) firm refers to an international sales office. These filters eliminate 58 firms,
leaving 419 firms that operate in a single state.
In contrast to our earlier analysis, the cash-flow channel does not require
a local investment bias because the cash-flow channel requires local operations.
For single-state firms, FPB equals CF FPB. The results in Panel B of Table 8
indicate that the firm-level cash flow betas are significant for firms operating in
a single state. In particular, the β1 coefficient equals 0.0062 (t-statistic = 2.21)
in the full specification with all control variables. Therefore, we find support for
the cash-flow channel among geographically concentrated firms whose operations
are limited to a single state. The positive β2 and β4 coefficients for BM and PRET,
respectively, are consistent with the value premium and momentum, respectively.
To compare the discount-rate channel versus the cash-flow channel, recall
that the β1 coefficient for FPB equals 0.0583 in Panel A of Table 3 with all control
variables, whereas a similar specification in Panel B of Table 8 yields a larger β1
coefficient of 0.0744. These analyses focus on firms that have a local investor base
and local operations, respectively. The larger coefficient associated with the cash-
flow channel is consistent with single-state firms having a higher equity premium
due to their undiversified operations. This difference in the equity premium is
more pronounced for firms without a local investor base (Panel C of Table 3) but
reverses for firms whose investor base is more local (Panel B of Table 3).
Finally, in unreported results, we estimate the panel regression specification
in equation (5) for firms that have a local bias at the 5% threshold to examine
134 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
TABLE 8
Cash-Flow Beta and Stock Returns
Table 8 reports the results from equation (10):
RETURNk = β0 +β1CF_FPBk +β2BMk +β3SIZEk +β4PRETk + γFCk + εk ,
which examines the return implications of firm-level cash-flow fiscal policy betas. The firm-level cash-flow fiscal policy
betas, denoted CF_FPB, weight the state-level fiscal policy betas according to the operations of a firm. Thus, firms with
more operations in a state have more cash-flow exposure to the state’s fiscal policy. Firm-level control variables include
book-to-market (BM) ratio, size (SIZE), and past return (PRET) characteristics, where PRET equals the firm’s return over
the prior 12 months after omitting the most recent month. FCk contains institutional ownership (IO), capital asset pricing
model beta (CAPM_BETA), and idiosyncratic volatility return (IVOL). The results in Panel A pertain to all firms, whereas
those in Panel B are for geographically concentrated firms that operate in a single state. t -statistics are below each of
the estimates in italics. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable 1 2 3
Panel A. All Firms














Intercept 0.0912 0.0552 0.1044
1.41 0.51 1.32
Adj. R 2 0.001 0.035 0.062
Panel B. Geographically Concentrated Firms














Intercept 0.1032*** 0.0360 0.1104
3.43 0.44 1.12
Adj. R 2 0.005 0.049 0.095
the cash-flow channel among firms with a local investor base rather than local
operations. However, we find that the β1 coefficients for CF FPB are insignificant.
This evidence confirms that the cash-flow channel is limited to firms with geo-
graphically concentrated operations. Therefore, our earlier results in Table 3 that
support the discount-rate channel are not driven by firms having local operations.
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V. Conclusions
Using state-level data within the United States, we find that consumption
risk is lower in states that implement countercyclical fiscal policies. Furthermore,
firms whose investor bases are concentrated in countercyclical states have lower
average stock returns. Equity market participation is also less volatile in counter-
cyclical states as a result of smaller declines in equity market participation during
recessions. The consumption and stock return implications of fiscal policy are
confirmed using the political affiliation of state governors and the deposit rules of
state-level budget-stabilization funds.
Our evidence is consistent with countercyclical fiscal policies being able to
lower the consumption risk of investors and, consequently, the equity premium
demanded by investors. This discount-rate channel requires geographic variation
across firms in the location of their investor bases. An alternative cash-flow chan-
nel, which requires geographic variation in firm-level operations, does not explain
the relation between fiscal policy and stock returns. Intuitively, the implications
of state-level fiscal policy are transmitted into asset prices through the location of
a firm’s investor base rather than the location of its operations.
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